



SURREY POLICE BOARD

Special Meeting Agenda

Venue: SPS HQ/VIA TEAMS

Date: May 12, 2026

Time: 2:30 PM

ITEM	PRESENTER
A. CALL TO ORDER	Chair
The Surrey Police Board recognizes that our work takes place on the ancestral, traditional, and unceded territories of the Coast Salish Peoples.	
B. DECLARATION OF CONFLICTS	Chair
C. ADOPTIONS	Chair
1. Adoption of the Agenda – May 12, 2026	
D. REPORTS	Chair
1. Amending of the Patrol Vehicle Purchase Authorization Resolution – Report 2026-FIN002 Amendment - FOR DECISION	
2. Service or Policy Complaint 2026-002 Report GOV005 – FOR DECISION	
3. Assumption of Responsibility for D2 and Risk Mitigation Options Report GOV006 – FOR DISCUSSION	
E. MOTION TO HOLD A MEETING IN A CLOSED SESSION	Chair
THAT the Surrey Police Board adjourn the public portion of the special meeting to move to a closed session to discuss the following matters in accordance with <i>Police Act</i> , section 69 (2)(a), (c) and (d) of the <i>Police Act</i> :	
1. Update on Collective Bargaining	Chief Lipinski
2. District 2 Operational Readiness Assessment	Chief Lipinski
F. RISE WITHOUT REPORT	Chair
G. ADJOURNMENT	Chair



BOARD REPORT

REPORT DATE: May 11, 2026

BOARD MEETING DATE: May 12, 2026

BOARD REPORT # 2026-FIN002
Amendment

TO: **Surrey Police Board**

FROM: **Executive Director**

FILE: **60550-20-02**

SUBJECT: **Amending the Patrol Vehicle Purchase Authorization Resolution**

This report is FOR DECISION.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- A resolution of the Surrey Police Board is required to amend a motion passed on April 30, 2026 which approved expenditure of an amount that exceeds what Council approved in the 2026 financial plan.
- The original motion approved an expenditure limit of \$7,684,000 for procurement of SPS patrol vehicles whereas the "Vehicles/Police Fleet" line in the financial plan is capped at \$7,115,000.
- The figure in the original motion was in error.
- The intention was always to proceed *within authorized spending limits*, and the error needs to be corrected by amending the part of the motion that established the expenditure cap.

RECOMMENDATION

The Executive Director recommends the Surrey Police Board rescind the following resolution approved on April 30, 2026:

THAT the Surrey Police Board establish an expenditure limit of \$7,684,000 for the acquisition of the vehicles;

and approve replacing it with a motion:

THAT the Surrey Police Board establish an expenditure limit of \$7,115,000 for the acquisition of the vehicles.

DISCUSSION

At the Surrey Police Board's regular meeting on April 30, 2026, the Board was presented with Board Report 2026-FIN002 (attached as **Appendix I**) in support of SPS's request for approval to purchase up to 68 patrol vehicles within a specified expenditure limit. The limit exceeds the total budget for the Vehicles/Police Fleet line in the 2026 financial plan the Board submitted to Council and Council approved. As such, the limit exceeds the Board's authority stated in section 27 (6) of the *Police Act* and must either be amended or the Board will have to obtain Council's approval to adjust the financial plan.

The discrepancy between the financial plan and the figure that appears in the original motion is attributable to miscommunication and human error. The \$7,684,000 figure that appears in the original motion is the amount for Vehicles/Police Fleet that was submitted as part of the provisional budget. After consultation with the City of Surrey, the Board adjusted Vehicles/Police Fleet to \$7,155,000. The adjusted amount was not communicated to SPS staff who prepared the report, and the report made it through the quality assurance process without the discrepancy being noticed.

The Vehicle/Police Fleet line includes estimates for patrol vehicles and motorcycles. The cost of vehicles may fluctuate between the time of order and time of delivery, due supply and demand and delays in supply chains. If the proposed amendment to the original resolution is adopted and the actual cost of vehicles varies from estimates, SPS will have to consider reducing the number of patrol vehicles and/or motorcycles it procures in the year.

OPTIONS

Option 1 – Amend the expenditure limit, reducing it from \$7,684,000 to \$7,115,000

Advantages

- Achieves compliance with *Police Act*, s. 27
- Fulfils pledge to Mayor and Council
- Ensures financial accountability

Disadvantages

- None

Option 2 – Do not amend the expenditure limit/require further work from staff by next board meeting

Advantages

- Allows for review and further oversight by the Finance and Risk Committee

Disadvantages

- Non-compliance with *Police Act*, s. 27 (6)
- Lack of consultation about this option with the City of Surrey
- Delays fulfilling pledge to Mayor and Council.

The Executive Director recommends Option 1



Jason Kuzminski
Executive Director



BOARD REPORT

REGULAR

REPORT DATE: April 27, 2026

BOARD MEETING DATE: April 30, 2026

BOARD REPORT # 2026-FIN002

TO: **Surrey Police Board**

FROM: **Finance and Risk Committee**

FILE: **60540-20-04**

SUBJECT: **Patrol Vehicle Purchase**

This report is FOR DECISION.

RECOMMENDATION

The Finance and Risk Committee recommends the Surrey Police Board (the "Board"):

1. Approve SPS to order up to 68 vehicles in 2026 from Mainland Ford Ltd. (the "Vehicles"):
 - a. 30 vehicles to be ordered during the Spring 2026 order bank; and
 - b. 38 vehicles during the Fall 2026 Ford order bank, unless additional new vehicles of different make/model are otherwise obtained in accordance with SPS procurement policy and procedures through arrangements with other vendors/suppliers.
2. Establish an expenditure limit of **\$7,684,000** for the acquisition of the Vehicles (including acquisition, accessories, customization, shipping, taxes, and contingency).
3. Authorize the Chief Constable to execute the necessary documents and agreements with Mainland Ford. for the acquisition of Vehicles up to the Total Contract Value.

SUMMARY

To support policing operations, SPS requires adequate supplies and equipment, which includes vehicles whose specifications meet certain standards for safety and frontline functional demands. To date, SPS's fleet inventory is comprised of vehicles transferred from the RCMP and vehicles procured in accordance with applicable policies and procedures. As SPS grows, it will need to procure additional vehicles not only to match increasing capacity but to replace vehicles that have reached the end of their serviceable life.

During consultations with the City of Surrey (through the Advisory Budgetary Committee), the fleet inventory and future requirements were discussed, with 68 new vehicles recommended and approved in the Council-approved 2026 financial plan. The City of Surrey recognizes the aging fleet needs to be replaced and that as SPS grows its authorized strength additional vehicles are required to equip SPS. High demand for these vehicles creates some urgency to initiate an order now, to improve the chance of delivery aligning with organization growth.

DISCUSSION

In October 2021, a formal procurement process for the purchase of police operational vehicles concluded with SPS awarding a contract for purchase of Ford Interceptor vehicles to Mainland Ford on an as and when required basis. The contract expires October 2026. Each vehicle costs approximately \$110,000. The cost of graphics/branding adds and additional cost of \$3,000 each, bringing the cost to approximately \$113,000 per vehicle. The cost of the vehicles becomes due when they are delivered.

Currently, there are 41 vehicles on order that are being outfitted. Delivery of these vehicles is expected between April and November 2026. The order bank for Ford PIU vehicles is now open and will close when the available vehicle bank is filled. Information received from the vendor is that demand is high and the bank will fill up quickly. As a result of the high market demand, it is advantageous to place an order early to ensure the number of vehicles needed for SPS operations can be reserved. Should SPS miss the spring order bank, the next order bank will not open until Fall 2026 delaying receipt of any new vehicles until late 2027.

SPS has informally signalled a request for 30 spots “in the queue” for the spring order bank. However, Mainland Ford cannot guarantee the hold without confirmation. If approval is received to place a reduced order in the spring cycle, it is likely that SPS vehicles may begin to arrive in early 2027. SPS will put in the remaining 38 vehicles into the Fall 2026 order bank.

To better align vehicle delivery with SPS operational need, SPS is canvassing other dealerships/vendors to determine availability of non-Ford options, including a Chevy model. While this alternate supplier would not impact on ordering 30 Ford vehicles during the spring 2026 order bank, it may accelerate the acquisition of the balance of the additional budgeted vehicles later throughout the year. Any further acquisition will comply with procurement policies and authority limits, and a request may be referred back to the Board for approval to proceed subject to availability of funds in the 2026 budget.

Price Validation:

Since SPS has acquired its current fleet of Ford Interceptors through competitive process, and, because of ongoing vehicle requirements, SPS staff monitor industry conditions, pricing impacts and market factors, SPS staff has knowledge as to pricing, pricing models, cost of add-ons/customization etc. These have been reviewed, considered and applied as a price validation tool to ensure costs associated with this proposed vehicle acquisition continues to provide good value to SPS.

Financial Approval:

The Chief Constable has primary responsibility for overall leadership and day-to-day management and operation of SPS. This includes the authority to commit resources and to enter into agreements in accordance with authority levels, budgets and the plans approved by the Board, and to undertake the processes necessary to meet organizational and operational requirements in a timely manner.

Since the Total Contract Value exceeds the Chief Constable’s financial authority, Board approval is required to support the acquisition. Although the financial obligation will not arise until vehicle delivery (expected early in 2027 for orders placed during the spring order period) and be included in the 2027 budget, to initiate the acquisition, approval is required by the Board as the holder of the appropriate level of financial authority pursuant to Policy AD 8.9 (*Delegation of Financial Authority and Appointment of Signing Officers*)

Contract Execution:

Upon approval by the Board, the Chief Constable will have the authority to execute an agreement with Mainland Ford to place an order for the vehicles.

Fleet Requirement, Current Inventory, and Transition Gap:

Fleet Management has advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], before accounting for normal replacement pressures (collisions/write-offs, mechanical downtime, and planned decommissioning). [REDACTED pursuant to s. 69(2)(a)]

In terms of vehicles already committed and expected to arrive, SPS currently has 41 vehicles on order indicating these units are being outfitted and are scheduled to arrive between April and November 2026. Fleet further confirms these 41 units are comprised of 25 vehicles from the 2024 purchase and 16 vehicles from the 2025 purchase. Once these 41 arrivals are received, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED pursuant to s. 69(2)(a)]

Importantly, the fleet challenge is not solely growth to end-state; it is also sustaining and replacing an aging fleet. Of the [REDACTED] currently available, 225 are over five years old and 193 are under five years old. Fleet also reports 111 vehicles are over 10 years old, reflecting the inherited condition and mileage profile of vehicles adopted from the RCMP. SPS's practice is to decommission active police vehicles at approximately 10 years or 175,000 km, recognizing that it is not financially feasible to replace every vehicle exactly at the target age/mileage; however, the age creates ongoing pressure that must be planned for alongside transition growth. Achieving the end-state count does not automatically ensure operational readiness if a significant portion of the fleet is nearing end-of-life.

Against this context, the proposed 2026 Ford order bank is intended to close the remaining transition gap and to stabilize operational readiness. The report seeks Board approval to order up to 68 vehicles in 2026—with an initial **30 vehicles** in the Spring 2026 order bank and up to **38** in the Fall 2026 order bank—because Ford's production capacity is constrained and order banks can close quickly once filled. While delivery and payment are expected in 2027 (payment due upon delivery), placing orders in 2026 secures production slots and reduces the risk of delayed receipt until late 2027 if SPS misses the Spring window. Fleet also notes there is a potential opportunity to receive some vehicles earlier (in 2026) if authorization is obtained while the 2026 production order bank remains open, whereas a delay in authority risks deferring deliveries and limiting SPS' ability to replace outdated, underperforming, damaged, or written-off vehicles, and may constrain capacity for major events and surge demands.

In summary, the 2026 committed arrivals bring SPS to approximately 459 vehicles by late 2026, leaving [REDACTED] end-state requirement; the proposed order of up to **68 vehicles** is therefore a measured step toward closing that gap while also mitigating the operational impacts of an aging fleet and constrained manufacturer lead times. The request does not represent surplus purchasing; rather, it is a risk-managed approach to securing long-lead manufacturing capacity to address a quantified transition shortfall and the reality of replacement cycles. The order is staged (Spring/Fall) and payment is due on delivery, allowing SPS to adjust the Fall order if circumstances change, while still protecting the organization's ability to meet operational deployment requirements.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Operational:

There are operational risks to not having adequate police vehicles on the road to attend calls; for training; and to replace vehicles that have been written off, reached their life cycle, or have too many kilometers on them. High demand for police vehicles and limited capacity in order banks require early planning and ordering to meet current and future operational needs.

Financial:

Payment is not required until vehicle delivery, which is scheduled to occur in 2027. Although SPS would place orders in 2026, if circumstances change necessitating a reduction to the vehicle order, SPS has been advised by the vendor it could do so without financial penalty while the vehicle is in the assembly line until delivered for customization and branding. High demand for police vehicles enables the vehicles to be allocated to other agencies. Further, if the purchase order is split between the Spring and Fall order banks, SPS would have the option not to place, or reduce, the Fall order.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Total financial implication	Approx. \$7,684,000	
This item is within Chief Constable Signing Authority	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
This item is within the annual approved budget	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
This item is a new funding request	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

Adequate resourcing of police vehicles is required to ensure proper coverage and deployment of police to files within established guidelines and response times. Vehicles are routinely taken off the road for periods of time for regular maintenance, repairs, and cleaning. A fully resourced fleet will ensure there are no gaps in service delivery.

OPTIONS

Option A – The Board approve the purchase of up to 68 police vehicles from Ford for approximately \$7,684,000, reserving the ability to secure vehicles, not to exceed the Authorization Limit, through a combination of vendors.

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A fiscally responsible approach to adding additional vehicles to the SPS fleet. Unforeseen circumstances to budget approval could be addressed later in the order process • Ensures minimum vehicle requirements may be placed in the queue now, with balance deferred to the Fall. • Takes into account receiving vehicles from SPOSU and balancing receipt of those vehicles with SPS needs • Giving long lead times associated with vehicle manufacture and the need to order early to obtain a spot in the manufacturing queue, allows ordering vehicles immediately and enabling spring order bank capacity issues being remedied in the Fall 2026 order window to ensure adequate number of vehicles are received and deployable in the future. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A split order or purchase deferral requires using vehicles transitioned over from the Surrey RCMP for a longer period, with missing vehicle history, and designed differently than vehicles that SPS has fitted up from the factory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reserves the ability for SPS to continue to canvass vehicle availability through other sources to meet operational need while maintaining budgetary limitations and controls. • Allows SPS to phase out former RCMP vehicles that have mileaged out, aged out, or have performance concerns. • Newer fleet has lower operating costs 	
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Option B– The Board approve the purchase of 30 vehicles immediately for approximately \$3,390,000.


Advantages	Disadvantages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same as Option A. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does not meet operational needs • Requires using vehicles transitioned over from the Surrey RCMP for a longer period, with missing vehicle history, and designed differently than vehicles that SPS has fitted up from the factory • Defers future planned purchase of 38 additional vehicles, requiring additional staff resources and approvals be engaged again at a later date • Delays in future approval processes may jeopardize ability to meet future order windows.


RECOMMENDATION

The Finance and Risk Committee recommends the Board approve Option A.

CONCLUSION

Approval is requested to authorize the acquisition of the Vehicles, approve the expenditure up to the Total Contract Value, and grant the Chief Constable signing authority to execute an agreement for the acquisition with Mainland Ford.

Corporate Services Bureau	Todd Matsumoto, Deputy Chief Constable 
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George Duncan
Chair, Finance and Risk Committee

REGULAR**REPORT DATE:** May 11, 2026**BOARD MEETING DATE:** May 12, 2026**BOARD REPORT #** 2026-GOV005**TO:** Surrey Police Board**FROM:** Governance Committee**FILE:** 60540-20-03**SUBJECT:** Service or Policy File No. 2026-002

This report is FOR DECISION.

SUMMARY

On April 29, 2026, the Surrey Police Board received correspondence that is attached as **Appendix I**. The correspondence outlines complaints about service the complainant and his child received after reporting the theft of a cell phone and an altercation between his child and another child at school. The correspondence includes concerns about the conduct of individual officers, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Police Complaint Commissioner, school administrators and Crown Counsel, but it also alleges inadequate and/or inappropriate SPS service and asks a question about differential treatment of the complainant's child who is a minor and a racialized individual.

ISSUE

1. Do the allegations appear to raise concerns about the adequacy or appropriateness of SPS services as contemplated in *Police Act*, s. 168 (1)?;
2. Does the complainant's question about the different treatment of his child (who is racialized) from SPS's treatment of another child indicate discriminatory policies or practices or a nexus to a human rights issue?
3. If yes to either or both of these questions, what course(s) of action set out in *Police Act*, s. 171 (1) does the Governance Committee recommend the Board take to address the complaint?

DISCUSSION

Part 11, Division 5 of the *Police Act* sets out the process respecting complaints about the municipal police service and legal requirements of municipal police boards.

Making a service or policy complaint

168 (1) Subject to subsection (3), any person may make a complaint to the complaint commissioner about

- (a) the general direction and management or operation of a municipal police department, or
- (b) the inadequacy or inappropriateness of any of the following in respect of a municipal police department:
 - (i) its staffing or resource allocation;
 - (ii) its training programs or resources;

- (iii) its standing orders or policies
- (iv) its ability to respond to requests for assistance;
- (v) its internal procedures

171 (1) On receiving a copy of a complaint... the board of the municipal police department concerned must promptly do one or more of the following:

- (a) request the chief constable of that municipal police department to investigate and report on the complaint;
- (b) initiate a study concerning the complaint;
- (c) initiate an investigation into the complaint;
- (d) dismiss the complaint on any of the grounds set out in subsection (2.1);
- (e) take any other course of action the board considers necessary to respond adequately to the complaint.

(2.1) The board may dismiss a complaint if the board determines that any of the following apply:

- (a) the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or not made in good faith;
- (b) the complaint is filed for an improper purpose or motive;
- (c) the complaint concerns a policy or service matter that has been appropriately resolved;
- (d) the complaint is not about a policy or service matter that
 - (i) is under the general direction and management or operation of the municipal police department, or
 - (ii) is otherwise described in section 168 (1).

ANALYSIS

A copy of the correspondence with highlighted sections that appear to raise service or policy concerns is attached as **Appendix II**. The Governance Committee does not determine whether any part of the correspondence is a service or policy complaint—only the full Board has this authority—but the committee’s role is review the allegations and make recommendations to the Board regarding whether the allegations meet the threshold set out in s. 168 (1) of the *Police Act* and, if so, to recommend a course of action to the Board that is among the options set out in s. 171 (1).

On the face of the highlighted sections, there are several allegations about inadequate or inappropriate training, policies and the ability to respond to a request for service. While allegations may not be substantiated after being investigated, the threshold for investigation or other action appears to be met. It is up to the Governance Committee, and ultimately the Board, to consider if any of the reasons for dismissing a complaint set out in s. 171 (2.1) apply, but staff’s assessment is that none do.

RECOMMENDATION

The nature of the allegations in the complaint may be categorized as falling within human resources policies and practices. As such, an appropriate recommendation from the Governance Committee to the Board would be to request the Chief Constable to investigate and report on the complaint to the Board, with particular attention paid to investigating and reporting on the complainant’s question regarding differential treatment of his child.



Hanne Madsen,
Chair, Governance Committee

Conversation with S. 22(1)**S. 22(1)**

March 6, 2026 @12:30 pm

Background details:

- Last year, S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) phone was stolen by fellow student, S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) was fully aware and capable of taking the phone that was hidden inside of the desk. S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) made repeated calls to SPS non-emergency line, but calls were not immediately returned
- S. 22(1) pinged the phone's location and was finally able to provide that information to SPS S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) also had information of the last location it was powered on and off which showed at the S. 22(1) residence
- S. 22(1) found that S. 22(1) was aggressive and rude to him, saying it was not a police issue, but a civil one.
- At some point later, S. 22(1) is believed to have attended the S. 22(1) house, knocked 3 times, but no one answered.
- S. 22(1) was advised by S. 22(1) that the file would be concluded, and to call back if they wanted anything else.
- But S. 22(1) insisted to keep the file open as the phone was still outstanding, and that investigative avenues were available. These avenues included speaking to S. 22(1), CCTV inquiry and speaking to others at the school that might have information about the phone.
- S. 22(1) was listening in on this call and advised S. 22(1) to put the phone on CPIC.
- On June 19, 2026, the phone was returned to S. 22(1) and the phone was destroyed.
- S. 22(1) concluded the file by speaking to S. 22(1) and advised S. 22(1) to settle civilly. S. 22(1) did not ask S. 22(1) how he wanted the file to be dealt with such as charge recommendation, restorative justice or civil restitution.
- S. 22(1) never compensated for the broken phone nor did S. 22(1) follow-up with S. 22(1) first.
- S. 22(1) phoned SPS for an update and spoke with S. 22(1)
- During this exchange, S. 22(1) describes S. 22(1) tone as aggressive and unhelpful
- Sometime after this (June 2025), while on lunch hour at S. 22(1) asked S. 22(1) if he could at least get the phone's case returned.
- S. 22(1) became angry and started to follow and threaten S. 22(1) with a metal memory stick and eventually attacked S. 22(1) with it.
- Clearly indicating in a video showed an object in S. 22(1) hand and S. 22(1) approaching to S. 22(1) to attack, in self-defence, S. 22(1) kicked S. 22(1) away. Video of this

altercation was captured by several witnesses in the school.

- Upon hearing of this incident, the S. 22(1) contacted SPS.
- Principal mentioned to S. 22(1) for "several hours there was no adult supervision with the incident." which is concerning on its own as it occurred during school hours.
- S. 22(1) was provided with one video of the incident from the principal, which only showed S. 22(1) kicking.
- S. 22(1) only obtained one video of the incident and did not investigate thoroughly or question the school of why there wasn't any supervision during school hours. S. 22(1) failed to speak to the other peers that were involved.
- Principal and Vice Principal emailed all parents and guardians of the school to delete any videos related to the incident rather than advising families to refrain from sharing.
- S. 22(1) attended, and arrested S. 22(1) for the assault on S. 22(1).
- S. 22(1) argued that his son is innocent based off the other videos obtained of the incident, which shows who initiated the incident.
- Other videos show it was S. 22(1) as the aggressor and initiated the attack and contributed to his own self harm and S. 22(1) DID NOT engage after defending himself. No mental health assessment was done on S. 22(1) despite evidence of self-harm.
- S. 22(1) did not view these videos before arresting S. 22(1)
- In July 2025, it is determined that no charges will be forwarded to Crown, although this information was not conveyed to S. 22(1) by SPS until the end of January 2026.
- Even though these charges were dropped by Crown. S. 22(1) did not inform S. 22(1) and still made S. 22(1) attend Probation and had S. 22(1) follow conditions that was not police enforceable.
- Conversation between S. 22(1) and S. 22(1) lawyer reveals that S. 22(1) was persistent on making S. 22(1) attend a court date and misinformed S. 22(1) lawyer about the restorative justice process via email
- If Crown did not want to proceed with charges, why was S. 22(1) lead to believe that charges were being forwarded.
- S. 22(1) mentioned to S. 22(1) lawyer via email that there's a court date even though the Crown dropped the case days before.
- In November 2025, a Youth advisor with SPS advised S. 22(1) that an alternate resolution was being sought and that it was unlikely that charges would be forwarded.
- S. 22(1) advised that S. 22(1) was "on probation" and that any further incident would result in charges
- S. 22(1) obtained FOIPPA which revealed that S. 22(1) advised S. 22(1) parent after finding the phone to deal with it civilly or contact
- FOIPPA also reported that S. 22(1) did not follow up with S. 22(1) to take action nor press charges against the S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) was not contacted by S. 22(1) on what should've been done but rather S. 22(1) allowing the perpetrators of mischief and theft to get away with the crime
- In a conversation with S. 22(1) regarding an update on the file, S. 22(1) threatened S. 22(1) that if S. 22(1) has another incident that he would go after S. 22(1) as he had a personal vendetta against S. 22(1) son.

- To date, neither S. 22(1) have been given the opportunity to give their account of the events.
- S. 22(1) family has publicly uploaded the incident with S. 22(1) image and with misinformation that resulted in threats from unknown people, while the case was on going.
- S. 22(1) family is unsure what dangers they'll face due to the publications the S. 22(1) family has falsely made against S. 22(1) Both kids still live in the same town.

Desired Outcome:

- S. 22(1) is dissatisfied with SPS' handling of the file and wants a proper investigation
- S. 22(1) would like to know why S. 22(1) was not charged with theft and mischief. With proof that he did commit an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada.
- Additionally, S. 22(1) questions why his son S. 22(1) was pushed into being charged yet when spoken to S. 22(1) on charging S. 22(1) refused to because S. 22(1) is a "minor". Is there a difference between S. 22(1) who's also minor too?
- S. 22(1) wants the S. 22(1) Principal and Vice Principal (at the time of the incident) and the police officers involved to be held accountable for causing distress to the S. 22(1) family.
- The S. 22(1) should be charged with mischief and possession of stolen property.
- Charge the S. 22(1) family for defamation, as they uploaded several images and videos of a minor without consent and falsely accusing the minor of a violent crime.
- Have the school liaison officers investigate why there was a lack of supervision during the altercation to prevent any further incidents at the school.

Conversation with S. 22(1)
S. 22(1)

March 6, 2026 @12:30 pm

Background details:

- Last year, S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) phone was stolen by fellow student, S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) was fully aware and capable of taking the phone that was hidden inside of the desk. S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) made repeated calls to SPS non-emergency line, but calls were not immediately returned
- S. 22(1) pinged the phone's location and was finally able to provide that information to SPS S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) also had information of the last location it was powered on and off which showed at the S. 22(1) residence
- S. 22(1) found that S. 22(1) was aggressive and rude to him, saying it was not a police issue, but a civil one.
- At some point later, S. 22(1) is believed to have attended the S. 22(1) house, knocked 3 times, but no one answered.
- S. 22(1) was advised by S. 22(1) that the file would be concluded, and to call back if they wanted anything else.
- But S. 22(1) insisted to keep the file open as the phone was still outstanding, and that investigative avenues were available. These avenues included speaking to S. 22(1) CCTV inquiry and speaking to others at the school that might have information about the phone.
- S. 22(1) was listening in on this call and advised S. 22(1) to put the phone on CPIC.
- On June 19, 2026, the phone was returned to S. 22(1) and the phone was destroyed. S. 22(1) concluded the file by speaking to S. 22(1) and advised S. 22(1) to settle civilly. S. 22(1) did not ask S. 22(1) how he wanted the file to be dealt with such as charge recommendation, restorative justice or civil restitution.
- S. 22(1) never compensated for the broken phone nor did S. 22(1) follow-up with S. 22(1) first.
- S. 22(1) phoned SPS for an update and spoke with S. 22(1)
- During this exchange, S. 22(1) describes S. 22(1) tone as aggressive and unhelpful
- Sometime after this (June 2025), while on lunch hour at S. 22(1) asked S. 22(1) if he could at least get the phone's case returned.
- S. 22(1) became angry and started to follow and threaten S. 22(1) with a metal memory stick and eventually attacked S. 22(1) with it.
- Clearly indicating in a video showed an object in S. 22(1) hand and S. 22(1) approaching to S. 22(1) to attack, in self-defence, S. 22(1) kicked S. 22(1) away. Video of this

altercation was captured by several witnesses in the school.

- Upon hearing of this incident, the S. 22(1) contacted SPS.
- Principal mentioned to S. 22(1) for “several hours there was no adult supervision with the incident.” which is concerning on its own as it occurred during school hours.
- S. 22(1) was provided with one video of the incident from the principal, which only showed S. 22(1) kicking.
- S. 22(1) only obtained one video of the incident and did not investigate thoroughly or question the school of why there wasn’t any supervision during school hours. S. 22(1) failed to speak to the other peers that were involved.
- Principal and Vice Principal emailed all parents and guardians of the school to delete any videos related to the incident rather than advising families to refrain from sharing.
- S. 22(1) attended, and arrested S. 22(1) for the assault on S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) argued that his son is innocent based off the other videos obtained of the incident, which shows who initiated the incident.
- Other videos show it was S. 22(1) as the aggressor and initiated the attack and contributed to his own self harm and S. 22(1) DID NOT engage after defending himself. No mental health assessment was done on S. 22(1) despite evidence of self-harm.
- S. 22(1) did not view these videos before arresting S. 22(1)
- In July 2025, it is determined that no charges will be forwarded to Crown, although this information was not conveyed to S. 22(1) by SPS until the end of January 2026.
- Even though these charges were dropped by Crown. S. 22(1) did not inform S. 22(1) and still made S. 22(1) attend Probation and had S. 22(1) follow conditions that was not police enforceable.
- Conversation between S. 22(1) and S. 22(1) lawyer reveals that S. 22(1) was persistent on making S. 22(1) attend a court date and misinformed S. 22(1) lawyer about the restorative justice process via email
- If Crown did not want to proceed with charges, why was S. 22(1) lead to believe that charges were being forwarded.
- S. 22(1) mentioned to S. 22(1) lawyer via email that there’s a court date even though the Crown dropped the case days before.
- In November 2025, a Youth advisor with SPS advised S. 22(1) that an alternate resolution was being sought and that it was unlikely that charges would be forwarded.
- S. 22(1) advised that S. 22(1) was “on probation” and that any further incident would result in charges
- S. 22(1) obtained FOIPPA which revealed that S. 22(1) advised S. 22(1) parent after finding the phone to deal with it civilly or contact S. 22(1)
- FOIPPA also reported that S. 22(1) did not follow up with S. 22(1) to take action nor press charges against the S. 22(1)
- S. 22(1) was not contacted by S. 22(1) on what should’ve been done but rather S. 22(1) allowing the perpetrators of mischief and theft to get away with the crime
- In a conversation with S. 22(1) regarding an update on the file, S. 22(1) threatened S. 22(1) that if S. 22(1) has another incident that he would go after S. 22(1) as he had a personal vendetta against S. 22(1) son.

- To date, neither S. 22(1) or S. 22(1) have been given the opportunity to give their account of the events.
- S. 22(1) family has publicly uploaded the incident with S. 22(1) image and with misinformation that resulted in threats from unknown people, while the case was on going.
- S. 22(1) family is unsure what dangers they'll face due to the publications the S. 22(1) family has falsely made against S. 22(1) Both kids still live in the same town.

Desired Outcome:

- S. 22(1) is dissatisfied with SPS' handling of the file and wants a proper investigation
- S. 22(1) would like to know why S. 22(1) was not charged with theft and mischief. With proof that he did commit an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada.
- Additionally, S. 22(1) questions why his son S. 22(1) was pushed into being charged yet when spoken to S. 22(1) on charging S. 22(1) S. 22(1) refused to because S. 22(1) is a "minor". Is there a difference between S. 22(1) who's also minor too?
- S. 22(1) wants the S. 22(1) Principal and Vice Principal (at the time of the incident) and the police officers involved to be held accountable for causing distress to the S. 22(1) family.
- The S. 22(1) should be charged with mischief and possession of stolen property.
- Charge the S. 22(1) family for defamation, as they uploaded several images and videos of a minor without consent and falsely accusing the minor of a violent crime.
- Have the school liaison officers investigate why there was a lack of supervision during the altercation to prevent any further incidents at the school.

May 7, 2026

VIA EMAIL: S. 22(1)

Dear S. 22(1)

Re: Surrey Police Board Service or Policy Complaint File No.

This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your correspondence of April 29, 2026. The Surrey Police Board met the following afternoon, at which time notice of your complaint was shared with directors, and a copy of your correspondence was forwarded to Chief Constable Lipinski.

At the meeting, the Board had the following options for actions to address the matter that are set out in the *Police Act*, s. 171 (1):

- (a) Request the Chief Constable of SPS investigate and report on the complaint;
- (b) Initiate a study concerning the complaint;
- (c) Initiate an investigation into the complaint;
- (d) Dismiss the complaint on grounds set out elsewhere in the Act; or
- (e) Take any other course of action the Board considers necessary to respond adequately to the complaint.

Because there was insufficient time between receipt of your correspondence and the meeting to redact personal information from the complaint, the Board received the complaint and relied on s. 171 (1)(e) to refer the complaint to its Governance Committee for further review and to make recommend a course of action to the Board when it next meets. The rationale for this decision was to ensure the complaint is reviewed as early as possible rather than delaying matters to the next scheduled board meeting.

Only the full Board has the authority to make decisions regarding the complaint, and decisions must be made in a public meeting. You will be notified of the meeting where the complaint will return to the Board so that you may attend in person or via live webcast. If you have any further questions or concerns, please contact Jason Kuzminski, Executive Director at Jason.Kuzminski@surreypoliceboard.ca.

Sincerely,



Harley Chappell
Chair, Surrey Police Board

Encl.

cc. Prabhu Rajan, Police Complaint Commissioner
Chief Constable Norm Lipinski, SPS
Jason Kuzminski, Surrey Police Board



BOARD REPORT

REPORT DATE: May 11, 2026

REGULAR

BOARD MEETING DATE: May 12, 2026

BOARD REPORT #: 2026-GOV006

TO: Surrey Police Board

FROM: Governance Committee

FILE: 60550-20-02

SUBJECT: Assumption of Responsibility for D2 and Risk Mitigation Options

This report is FOR DISCUSSION.

PURPOSE

To outline operational, organizational and governance options available to support the safe and effective accelerated assumption of responsibility for policing District 2 (Guildford and Fleetwood) by SPS.

ISSUE

SPS is facing pressure to accelerate the transition and operational takeover of District 2 earlier than originally planned. While acceleration may achieve strategic, political and/or operational objectives, it also introduces significant risks related to staffing, service continuity, public and responder safety, operational readiness and organizational resilience. Without appropriate mitigation measures, rapid expansion may adversely affect:

- Emergency response capability
- Workforce sustainability and fatigue management
- Supervisory effectiveness
- Public confidence
- Interoperability and communications
- Legal and regulatory compliance
- Organizational reputation and liability exposure

BACKGROUND

Planning transition into new territory typically relies on phased implementation timelines that allow for:

- Recruitment and training
- Infrastructure and IT readiness
- Operational testing
- Stakeholder coordination
- Workforce stabilization

Accelerating implementation compresses these activities and reduces available time to identify and address operational gaps. Adequate surge capacity and transitional controls need to be identified and implemented to mitigate risk of service degradation, elevated error rates, and personnel burnout..

CONSIDERATIONS

Operational Readiness

A formal, objective operational readiness assessment should be completed prior to accelerated implementation. Areas requiring validation include:

- Minimum safe staffing levels
- Records and evidence management systems

- Dispatch and communications interoperability
- Supervisory ratios
- Fleet, equipment and facilities readiness
- Specialized response capabilities
- Legal and policy alignment

The Chief Constable should identify minimum thresholds below which transition (without additional supports) creates unacceptable risk, and the Board and Chief Constable should identify, negotiate and implement additional supports that mitigate risk to acceptable levels.

Workforce Capacity and Fatigue

The Board and Chief Constable must consider the impact of accelerated transition on SPS personnel as it builds workforce capacity through recruitment. Potential temporary surge staffing measures to mitigate unacceptable risk include:

- Mutual assistance agreements
- Temporary secondments
- Overtime arrangements with RCMP and police board in neighbouring municipalities
- Limited overtime deployment
- Short-term contracts to retired officers

Sustained reliance on overtime presents elevated fatigue and wellness risks and should be accompanied by mandatory rest periods; overtime caps; enhanced wellness supports; and monitoring absenteeism, conduct issues, and injury indicators.

Service Prioritization

Preserving frontline emergency response capacity throughout the course of transition is critical. The Board, as representatives of the community and its policing priorities, must work with the Chief Constable to identify other essential services and acceptable service levels and distinguish these from services that may be temporarily paused or reduced. This may require:

- Deferring non-essential initiatives
- Reducing administrative burdens
- Delaying discretionary projects
- Centralizing specialized services
- Reducing secondary units to agreed upon minimum levels
- Adjusting service levels for lower-priority calls

Critical life-safety and high-liability functions must remain prioritized.

Governance and Oversight

A temporary joint governance or unified command structure may support continuity during transition through shared operational oversight, common operating procedures, and transitional supervisory review. As quasi-judicial reviews of policing oversight, beginning with the Morden Report, have stated and re-stated, the conceptual distinction between governance and operations has changed and requires police boards to take an active role in independent oversight and creating performance monitoring mechanisms to identify emerging risks early.

OPTIONS

Option 1 – Maintain Original Transition Timeline

Continue implementation according to initial phased schedule.

Advantages

- Lowest operational risk
- Greater workforce stabilization
- More time for training and testing

Disadvantages

- Delays realization of strategic priority
- Does not satisfy external expectations or timelines

Option 2 – Phased Acceleration of Transition

Accelerate implementation while maintaining phased operational controls, identifying, negotiating and implementing temporary surge capacity measures in partnership with the provincial government, RCMP and police boards of neighbouring jurisdictions.

Advantages

- Balances urgency with operational safety
- Allows incremental risk management
- Supports continuity of essential services

Disadvantages

- Requires intensive coordination and oversight
- Requires culture shifts internally and externally
- May involve temporary increased costs

Option 3 – Full Accelerated Takeover

Assume all responsibilities within an abbreviated timeframe.

Advantages

- Fastest implementation
- Simplifies transitional governance
- Satisfies expectations of external partners

Disadvantages

- Highest operational and workforce risk
- Increased probability of service degradation and implementation failures
- Increased probability of fatigue-related issues
- Reduced ability to identify and correct deficiencies prior to full deployment
- Potential reputational risk with detractors

To assess these options, it is urgent for the Board to receive the information necessary to a formal, objective operational readiness assessment of the earliest date for safe takeover of District 2 based on current resources and assumptions. Only then will the Board be in a position to make data-informed decisions about the appropriate timeframe and whether it can be accelerated by viable temporary surge capacity measures or acceptable reduction to secondary services that mitigate risk to safe levels.

CONCLUSION

The work ahead will include clearly defining minimum safety thresholds, exploring temporary surge staffing and mutual assistance arrangements, and enhanced fatigue-management measures. It will also require culture shift in which the Board can establish its rightful role in transitional governance and oversight through ongoing operational monitoring and reporting. Key risks if acceleration proceeds without mitigation are degradation of emergency response, increased employee fatigue and burnout, supervisory and training shortfalls, elevated legal and reputational exposure, increased likelihood of critical incidents and reduced public trust.

The next steps are completion of an operational readiness assessment, followed by identification of minimum staffing and deployment thresholds that closely examine each unit and prioritize them. This foundational work will allow the organization to develop an implementation schedule and to work with partners to confirm surge staffing and mutual assistance arrangements, in order to make an informed decision about the options. Once an option is determined, the Board and Chief Constable will need to establish a transition governance structure, develop and implement fatigue-management and wellness monitoring, and develop an operational performance reporting framework.



Hanne Madsen
Chair, Governance Committee